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JOHN LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL PIETY:
REASON IS THE CANDLE OF THE LORD
Nicholas Wolterstorff

Not only is John Locke's thought shaped by Christian conviction; interspersed in his writings on politics and epistemology are suggestions as to
how his conclusions on these matters are to be incorporated into lives of
Christian piety. In this paper I focus on Locke's views as to how his epistemology,
with its peculiar blend of skepticism and confidence, is to be incorporated into
a life of gratitude and obedience. The theme of Reason, as an indistinguishable
source of light given from God, is prominent in the discussion.

John Locke's philosophy is an episode in the history of Christian thought-by
which I do not mean that it contains Christian thoughts here and there, but
that the fundamental framework of Locke's philosophical reflections is Christianity. "A Christian I am sure I am," Locke wrote on one occasion (Works
VII,359). We don't need Locke's testimony for that; nor do we need biographical background. It's evident from his writing. Locke's Christianity was
not an allegiance in addition to his philosophy but the fundamental framework
thereof. Naturally some parts of his philosophical thought are more intimately
intertwined with that framework than others, so that, for purposes of discussion or appropriation, one and another part can be abstracted and the Christian
character of the framework momentarily neglected. Nonetheless, the point
remains: It is Christianity that provides the fundamental pattern and dynamic
of Locke's philosophy; we constantly run the danger of misunderstanding
what he is saying and why he is saying it unless we take account of that. I
That claim deserves detailed defense. On this occasion, however, I will
instead develop the argument that Locke's philosophical writing, beyond
being an episode in the history of Christian thought, is an episode in the
history of Christian piety. Locke tells us how the picture at which he has
arrived, of our place as human beings in the scheme of things, should be
appropriated into a life of Christian piety. He articulates a political piety,
appropriate to our political condition; and, more strikingly, an epistemological piety, appropriate to our epistemological condition. It is the contours of
that latter piety that I will be describing. A full discussion would of course
have to show how these two sides of Locke's piety fit together into one whole.
Locke gave birth to a new type of Christian piety-more accurately, helped
to give birth to a new type. The type does not, to the best of my knowledge,
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 11 No.4 October 1994

All rights reserved.

572

JOHN LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL PIETY

573

have a name; but just as we call a certain type of Christian piety, "Lutheran
piety," so I propose to call this type, "Lockean piety." Lockean piety became
extraordinarily pervasive in the modern Western world, and has proved unusually enduring. It's my impression that today it is to be found mainly,
though certainly not exclusively, among those 'evangelicals' whose religious
roots lie in England-among Anglo-evangelicals. Let me characterize the
type with some quick broad strokes.
Fundamental to Lockean piety is a deep sense of gratitude to God for
Reason, and an equally deep sense of obligation to God to use one's Reason,
and to use it properly. This commitment to obedience takes the form of being
deeply concerned with the attainment of certainty, and with believing what
is probable on the basis of what is certain. Modern natural science is seen as
a paradigmatic example of using Reason properly. Rather often, in fact, the
Lockean pietist is a natural scientist by profession; but whether or not she is
that, she will be deeply committed to using Reason in religion and morality
in the same way in which it is used in good natural science. The Lockean
pietist is typically suspicious of the humanities, perhaps not for what they
are in essence, but certainly for what they are in fact. In them one sees very
little of the proper use of Reason, as witnessed by their heavy dependence
on tradition. In Lockean piety, tradition is up against the firing wall-theological tradition, ecclesiastical tradition, intellectual tradition, makes no difference. Unless, of course, the tradition in question is a tradition like that of
modern natural science, in which Reason has been properly used.
The outsider to Lockean piety who thinks of faith as trust has the impression that, in Lockean piety, Reason has replaced God-in-Christ as the object
of Christian faith. The Lockean pietist dismisses this as imperceptive. But all
too often the battle never really joins. For the Lockean thinks of faith differently. Faith is the acceptance of proposi tions on the ground of their being (or
having been) revealed by God. Faith, thus understood, if properly held, is
based on Reason. The revelation whose content faith accepts is not reduced
to the deliverances of Reason; not at all. But God asks of us that we test the
many competing claims to revelation that come our way-that we "test the
spirits." It would be deeply irresponsible on our part not to do so.
A condition of holding the Christian faith responsibly is that one first
establish that the Christian scriptures are a reliable record of ancient revelation; then, but only then, is one entitled to accept the content of the revelation.
Locke himself was of the conviction that the Bible is in fact an inerrant record
of revelation; that conviction has remained characteristic of Lockean piety.
But in any case, the Bible is central in Lockean piety. Not one and another
tradition of biblical interpretation; those are all human. Just the Bible. Of
course Jesus Christ is also important; he was the principal revealer. But our
only access to him is through the Bible; so in Lockean piety, given its epis-
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temological preoccupations, the Bible is more prominent than Jesus Christ.
It's no accident that Karl Barth has evoked such hostility among evangelicals;
as does 'post-modernism,' with its celebration of tradition, its scepticism
concerning the possibility of getting to 'the things themselves,' its unconcern
with certainty, its charge that Reason is tyrannical.
Not only does the Lockean pietist seek and assemble and rehearse evidence
that the Bible is an inerrant record of God's revelation; she seeks and assembles and rehearses evidence for the prior claim that God exists. God, in
Lockean piety, is never someone of whom one is aware-someone present to
one. God is an inferred entity. That's not to deny that God works both in us
and in history. But we infer that God does so, from the traces; God is no more
present to us for our awareness than are sticks and stones and bones-and
other persons.
A natural consequence of all this is that the Lockean pietist regards the
work of the academy with a peculiar blend of hope and dread. While the
results of that work bear the promise of containing new evidence for God's
existence and for the Bible as the inerrant record of divine revelation, they
also bear the menace of undercutting or defeating what one had taken to be
good evidence for those. The pursuit of certainty causes anxiety.
This is that general type of Christian piety of which, as I read the history,
John Locke was the great founder. Let me now describe the precise form it
took in Locke himself, concluding with just a few critical observations. 2
Over and over in his Essay, when Locke wants to draw our attention to the
main features of the picture which he there draws of our place as knowers
and believers in the world, he uses three terms as a metaphor cluster: "daylight," "darkness," and "twilight." It's important to know in advance that the
sort of 'half-light' he has in mind when he speaks of twilight is not only the
half-light produced by the sun just below the horizon, but also the 'half-light'
produced by the glow of a candle.
If you tell me, on a certain occasion, that you feel dizzy, and I believe you,
then I have acquired a cognitive grip on your dizziness sufficient for me to
make judgments about it, believe things about it, form intentions concerning
it, and so forth. I may, for example, form the judgment about it-not about
something else, but about it-that it was caused by your having ridden that
merry-go-round too long. Or without your saying anything, I might interpret
your staggering around after riding the merry-go-round as a manifestation of
your dizziness; that would also give me a cognitive grip on your dizziness
sufficient for me to form judgments, beliefs, and intentions about it. Either
way, though, I'm not aware of your dizziness, as I would be of my own
dizziness if I felt dizzy.
There are a great many philosophers and literary theorists writing presently
who, if their words are to be taken at face value, deny that we human beings
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are ever aware of anything. All is interpretation, nothing is given. Apparently
interpretations themselves are not given. Nothing is ever presented to us for
our awareness. There is no presence.
John Locke was of course unacquainted with twentieth-century hermeneutical writing; without argument or hesitation he assumed that we human
beings are aware of certain entities. The word Locke himself favored was
"perceive," used metaphorically. We 'perceive' certain entities, including
certain facts. Or to use, in turn, his parlance for what I call facts: We 'perceive' certain agreements and disagreements among entities. For Locke, the
only live question was the scope of awareness.
His answer, famously, was that it is only of one's own ideas, and their
agreements and disagreements, that one can be aware. I shall on this occasion
strenuously resist the temptation to try to say what exactly Locke meant by
"ideas"-if, indeed, there is anything exact that he meant by it. I think,
however, that the meaning of the verb "conscious of' in contemporary English is such that we can express Locke's view this way: One is truly aware
only of those entities that one is conscious of, and whose logical relationships
one grasps. I am conscious of my dizziness, when I am dizzy; Locke would
say that my dizziness is something that I 'perceive.' When I judge about
something that it is a prime number, I am both conscious of doing so and
conscious of my thought about it; Locke would say that the act of judging
and the predicative thought are items that I 'perceive.'
Locke's official account of knowledge was that knowledge is awareness,
'perception.' I call it his "official account" because, in the fine mesh of his
discussion, he knowingly backs away from the identification of knowledge
with awareness. That is perhaps most decisively clear in his discussion of
memory. He observes that we remember many things that we don't actively
have in mind-things that we aren't presently conscious of; and he concedes
that some of such rememberings are knowings. In Locke's unsteady attempts
to sort out the relation between knowledge and awareness, one sees conflicting impulses at work. But what he never wavers on is his conviction that it
is only objects of consciousness that one is aware of; only those are present
to one for one's 'perception.'
And now for the first use of the metaphor cluster: "Light, true light in the
mind is, or can be nothing else but the evidence of the truth of any proposition ... " (Essay IV,xix,13). The light of evidence has its source in those facts
of which the mind is aware-which are evident to the mind. These cast light
on those other facts for which they are evidence; they illuminate those others.
But they are themselves the only true light-sources. They are to the mind as
the light of the sun is to the physical eye. Such a fact "is irresistible, and like
the bright Sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be perceived, as soon as
ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for hesitation,
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doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of
it" (Essay IV,ii,1).
All else is dark. And when we take due note of the fact that those items
and facts susceptible of human awareness are "very short and scanty"
(IV,xiv, I) compared to the totality ofthings, we realize that these light sources
are tiny dots in what, apart from the illumination they cast on a few other
facts, is an "abyss of darkness" (IV,iii,22). Our "knowledge [is] limited to
our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent, or perfection .... " These
are "very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of all being, and far short
of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings,
not tied down to the dull and narrow information, is to be received from some
few, and not very acute ways of perception, such as are our senses .... " It
would nonetheless "be well with us, if our knowledge were but as large as
our ideas, and there were not many doubts and enquiries concerning the ideas
we have;" but even that proves not to be the case (lV,iii,6).
Locke devotes page after page to this theme of "how disproportionate our
knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings," not to mention of
spirits, "which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have
no cognizance," so that "almost the whole intellectual world" is concealed
from us "in an impenetrable obscurity" (IV,iii,27). Yet a good many commentators give that theme at best a minor place in their presentation of Locke's
thought. The problem-part of it, at least-is Locke's rhetoric. We would
expect, from someone so profoundly impressed with the scope of our ignorance, intense and anguished rhetoric. There's intensity in some of Locke's
rhetoric, but no anguish; all is serene. That itself-as will shortly become
clear-is a manifestation of Locke's piety; Locke's rhetoric is the rhetoric of
contentment. Such piety is unfamiliar to us. Nonetheless the theme, to those
who have ears to hear, is ringingly clear:
Our knowledge being so narrow, as I have shew'd it, it will, perhaps, give
us some light into the present state of our minds, if we look a little into the
dark side, and take a view of our ignorance: which being infinitely larger
than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes, and improvement of useful knowledge; if discovering how far we have clear and
distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those
things, that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch not out
into that abyss of darkness (where we have not eyes to see, nor faculties to
perceive anything,) out of a presumption, that nothing is beyond our comprehension (IV,iii,22).

Items of intuitive knowledge, when present to the mind, force themselves
to be 'perceived' "as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way," said
Locke. Thus the will has an important, though ultimately secondary, role to
play in what we come to know. The analogy to vision is again instructive.
Though "a man with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see; yet there be
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certain objects, which he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to." And
then further: "though he turns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he
may choose whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent application, endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it" (IV,xiii, 1-2). So
too, "the employing, or withholding any of our faculties from this or that sort
of objects," is a matter of volition on our part, as is our "more, or less accurate
survey of them" (lV,xiii,2). Apart from that, however, "our will hath no power
to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or other; that is done only
by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered" (ibid.).
Though that is the whole of the will's role in the formation of intuitive
knowledge, it is by no means the whole of the will's role in the formation of
knowledge in general. We have it in our power to construct arguments in
which, as Locke sees the matter, we come to 'perceive' agreements and
di~agreements among ideas which we would have missed but for the fact that,
in the argument, we interpose between those 'extremes' a greater or lesser
number of 'middle terms' whose inter-relations we 'perceive' as we move
along the argument. If this is to yield knowledge it must also be the case, of
course, that when we arrive at the final term, we remember the path we have
taken. By and large we have to construct such arguments; we don't just
passively receive them. And in that construction, the will plays a significant
role.
we have, here and there, a little of this clear light, some sparks of bright
knowledge: yet the greatest part of our ideas are such, that we cannot discern
their agreement, or disagreement, by an immediate comparing them. And in
all these, we have need of reasoning, and must, by discourse and inference,
make our discoveries (IV,xvii,15).

There is thus considerable scope for what Locke calls "the improvement
of our knowledge." Though nature is hardly at all susceptible to being known
by us, the situation for religion and morality-along with mathematics-is
quite different. In principle it's possible to go a long way in the construction
of a demonstrative theology and a demonstrative morality. One might even
say that "morality [that is, the acquisition of moral knowledge] is the proper
science, and business of mankind in general (who are both concerned, and
fitted to search out their summum bonum) ... "(IV,xii, 11). It's true that our
knowledge will "never reach to all we might desire to know concerning [even]
those ideas we have ... " (IV,iii,6). Nevertheless, says Locke,
I do not question, but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances
of our beings and constitutions may be carried much farther, than it hitherto
has been, if men would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that
industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth,
which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a system,
interest, or party, they are once engaged in (lV,iii,6).
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Demonstrative arguments are sources of light; they, along with the objects
of intuitive knowledge, shed light into the mind. At bottom it's the same kind
of light: viz., "the evidence of the truth of [a] proposition." But the light cast
by demonstrative arguments is less intense, its brilliance diminished by the
presence of all those 'middle terms' and by the need for memory.
Locke was presumably aware of the fact that many of his readers would be
tempted to respond to his argument that "our understandings [come] exceeding short of the vast extent of things" (I,i,5) by railing against the absurdity
of our fate-against its "whimsicalness," to use Hume's term. But in fact he
never so much as explicitly acknowledges the temptation. Instead, after
swiftly drawing a sketch of our state in the opening chapter of the Essay, he
immediately moves on to urge, in the first place, contentment: "to stop, when
[the understanding] is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a
quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be
beyond the reach of our capacities;" to "learn to content ourselves with what
is attainable by us in this state" (I,i,4). And then, even more strikingly,
gratitude. Rather than railing against the cosmos for all that our nature makes
us incapablle of knowing, let us take note of what we are capable of knowing,
let us acknowledge that our capacities for such knowledge have been bestowed on us by God, and let us thank God accordingly. Though "the comprehension of our understandings, comes exceeding short of the vast extent
of things; yet, we ... have cause enough to magnify the bountiful author of our
being, for that portion and degree of knowledge, he has bestowed on us, so
far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion" (I,i,5).
And what, specifically, is it about our human capacities for knowledge that
we should be thankful for? That God has given to human beings "whatsoever
is necessary for the conveniences of life, and information of virtue; and has
put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provision for this life
and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may
come of an universal, or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet
secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to
the knowledge of their maker, and the sight of their duties" (I,i,5).
Our powers of knowledge have been bestowed on us by God; to the discernment of the beneficial contours of what lies within those powers, the
appropriate response is contented gratitude. But it is up to us to use those
powers to (:xpand our knowledge-specifically, to use them as God has obligated us to use them. To Locke's epistemological piety concerning knowledge there are thus two sides: Obedience along with Gratitude.
We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds,
if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they
are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advanlages of our knowledge, and neglect to
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improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some
things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and
untoward servant, who would not attend his business by candle-light, to plead
that he had not broad sunshine. The candle, that is set up in us, shines bright
enough for all our purposes (l,i,5).

We have heard Locke speaking of sunlight, in varying degrees of brightness, and of darkness; now, suddenly, candles and candlelight. What does he
have in mind? The truth is that he has changed the subject-abruptly so. Let
me begin laying out the new subject by quoting from the next sentence: "we
shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that
way and proportion, that they are suited to our faculties; and upon those
grounds, they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily, or
intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had .... " Just as we had not previously heard of candles
and candlelight, so we have not previously heard of probability. They are all
connected.
Locke spends the first thirteen chapters of Book IV of the Essay discussing
one and another aspect of knowledge. I have already observed that he wavers
a bit in what he takes knowledge to be; nonetheless, this at least can be said:
Knowledge in its paradigmatic form is awareness, 'perception'. At the beginning of chapter xiv he turns to a new topic, on which he then spends the
remainder of the Essay. That new topic is belief and judgment. He introduces
the topic like this:
The understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation,
but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss, if he had
nothing to direct him, but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that
being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in
the dark, and in most of the actions of his life, perfectly at a stand, had he
nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge (lV,xiv,I).

In fact we human beings have something more to direct and guide us than
knowledge. That 'something more' is as much part of our creaturely endowment as is our capacity for knowledge; for it, too, gratitude to God is the
appropriate response.
This 'something more' has two sides, one of those being, in place of bright
light of "the certainty of true knowledge," the twilight of probability:
as God has set some things in broad daylight; as he has given us some certain
knowledge, though limited to a few things in comparison, probably, as a taste
of what intellectual creatures are capable of, to excite in us a desire and
endeavour after a better state: So in the greatest part of our concernment, he
has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of probability, suitable, I
presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationers hip, he has been pleased
to place us in here ... (IV,xiv,2).3
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The other side of the 'something more' is judgment and belief. "The faculty,
which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge
in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment: whereby the mind takes its
ideas to agree, or disagree; or which is the same, any proposition to be true
or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs"
(lV,xiv,3).
Knowledge is the awareness of a fact-or in Lockean terminology, the
'perception' of some agreement or disagreement among entities. Thereby it
is also the awareness of the truth of the corresponding proposition. Judgment
and belief, by contrast, are the taking of entities to agree or disagree, the
taking of propositions to be true. Obviously there is no hope whatsoever of
understanding Locke if we read him through the lens of the contemporary
epistemological consensus that knowledge is a species of belief. Indeed, the
way in which Locke introduces the knowledge/judgment distinction, in the
passage cited, would lead one to infer that he goes so far in the other direction
as to hold that judgment and belief are only present when knowledge is
absent. In fact, though, it was his view that awareness of some fact typically
evokes the taking of the corresponding proposition to be true; knowledge,
though not a species of belief, nonetheless typically evokes a correlative
belief. (That this is Locke's view comes to the surface especially in his
chapter on "Maxims," in IV,vii.)
We saw earlier that corresponding to God's gift to us of the capacity for
knowledge are God's commands to us concerning the acquisition of knowledge; the appropriate piety included, as we saw, both contented gratitude and
obedience. So too for judgment and belief: the appropriate piety includes
obedience along with gratitude. The character of the divine injunction to
which obedience is required is somewhat different in this case, however. What
God asks of us qua cognitive beings is that we expand our knowledge in
various directions. That's not what God asks of us qua doxastic beings. For
whereas only facts can be 'perceived,' falsehoods are as readily believed as
truths. What God asks of us is that we regulate our belief-forming faculties,
not so that we believe more things, but so that we believe fewer false things.
Assent of the mind, says Locke,
if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything, but upon
good rea:son .... He that believes, without having any reason for believing, may
be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays
the obedience due to his maker, who would have him use those discerning
faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and errour. He that
does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth,
is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the
accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain,
that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he
that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks
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sincerely to discover truth, by those helps and abilities he has, may have this
satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that though he should
miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right,
and places it as he should, who in any case or matter whatsoever, believes
or disbelieves, according as reason directs him. He that does otherwise,
transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties, which were
given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clear evidence, and
greater probability (lV,xvii,24).

Light and faculties, clear evidence, greater probability: We must try to
understand what Locke has in mind in speaking of those. First, though, a
quick comment on the scope of doxastic obligation. The passage I have
quoted is ringingly universalistic in tone: Everyone in any case or matter
whatsoever .... But in the course of Locke's discussion it becomes clear that
he doesn't really mean this. The method he recommends takes time to apply;
no one has time to apply it for all of her beliefs, and some have time to apply
it for only a few. Locke's thought is this: Each of us is obligated, for certain
issues, to try our best to get in touch with reality on that issue. Let us say
that some proposition is of maximal concernment-"concernment" is Locke's
word-to a person just in case that person is obligated to try his or her best
to bring it about that he or she believes it if and only if it is true. The method
which Locke outlines is the method which, in his judgment, we must use
when some proposition is of maximal concernment to us. Many of the propositions we believe and entertain are not of maximal concernment to us; for
such, we are under no obligation to use the method. Only in the light of a
person's total obligations can one determine which propositions are of maximal concernment to her. And the results of the determination will differ from
person to person-with just this proviso: Fundamental matters of morality
and religion are of maximal concernment to everyone.
Now for the method. Suppose that proposition P is a matter of maximal
concernment for me; I am under obligation to try my best to bring it about
that I believe P if and only if P is true. What do I do? What method do I
follow? I begin by gathering a satisfactory body of evidence concerning the
truth or falsehood of P. That body of evidence must consist of things that I
know-know in Locke's stringent sense of "know." Otherwise, I'm not doing
my best. But obviously more is required than that. It must be a satisfactory
collection of items of knowledge. Locke doesn't say a great deal about what
that comes to. But clearly the body of evidence must be of sufficient amplitude, and must not be skewed. In its totality it must be a reliable indicator of
whether P is true or false. Once I have gathered a satisfactory body of evidence, I then determine the probability of P on that evidence. And lastly, I
endeavor to believe or disbelieve P with a firmness appropriate to its probability on that evidence.
And where is Reason in all this? Locke wavers in what he calls Reason.
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Sometimes the set of mental activities that he calls "Reason" is wide in its
scope, sometimes, narrow. Probably the widest is that indicated in this passage:
we may in Reason consider these four degrees; the first and highest, is the
discovering, and finding out of proofs; the second. the regular and methodical
disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order, to make their
connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their connection; and the fourth, the making a right conclusion (IV,xvii,3).
Locke's subsequent discussion leaves little doubt that he regards the third in
this list as fundamental. He says as much himself, just before he gives the
four-fold list. The "faculty which finds out the means, and rightly applies
them to discover certainty in the one [case], and probability in the other, is
that which we call Reason," he says. He continues: "For as Reason perceives
the necessary, and indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to
another, in each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge: so it
likewise perceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to
another, in every step of a discourse, to which it will think assent due." And
then he adds: "This is the lowest degree of that, which can be truly called
Reason"-by "lowest degree" clearly meaning, fundamental degree.
It's easy now to see why Locke spoke of the twilight of probability-that
is to say, of the half-light of probability. The only light-sources are those facts
which the mind 'perceives.' When 'perceived' facts are assembled into some
demonstrative proof, the light cast by all of them together on the agreement
or disagreement of the terms in the conclusion is dimmed somewhat by the
presence of the middle terms in the proof and by the need for memory. When
'perceived' facts are assembled into the evidence for some non-demonstrative
inference, the light they cast on the conclusion is dimmed yet farther-so
much so that, unless the probability is very high, we find ourselves in a sort
of half-light.
One could wish that Locke had always used his metaphor-cluster as I have
thus far reported. Though he warns, in a famous passage in Book III of the
Essay, against metaphorical thinking in philosophy, he is in fact one of the
great metaphor makers of the English philosophical tradition. If one didn't
already know that, it would be clear just from the passages I have cited. But
in the matter at hand, Locke's gift fails him; his use of the light metaphors
falls into incoherence.
In all the passages I have cited thus far, the light comes from the things
'perceived.' Let's have before us, once more, the basic passage:
Light, true light in the mind is, or can be nothing else but the evidence of
the truth of any proposition; and if it be not a self-evident proposition, all
the light iit has, or can have, is from the clearness and validity of those proofs,
upon which it is received. To talk of any other light in the understanding is
to put ourselves in the dark, or in the power of the Prince of Darkness
(IV,xix,13).
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But when Locke spoke, in another passage I cited, of "the candle that is set
up in us" which "shines bright enough for all our purposes," it was Reason
he had in mind. "The light of Reason" (I,iv,9, and passim) is "the candle of
the Lord" (IV,iii,20, and passim).
So what is the situation: Is it the facts we 'perceive' which are the lightsources, and do they illuminate the things we properly infer from them; or is
it our faculty of Reason which is the light-source, illuminating the things
perceived and properly inferred? It's as clear as anything is in Locke that he
would answer, "The former." But Locke was also the inheritor of a long
tradition in which writers regularly spoke of "the light of Reason;" perhaps
it was the tug of that tradition on him that led him to stray into incoherence.
Though that can't be the whole of the matter, since it's obvious that the
apothegm, "Reason is the candle of the Lord," was a favorite of his; no
inadvertence here.
The incoherence of Locke's use of the metaphors doesn't ultimately matter.
Doesn't matter philosophically, that is to say; aesthetically, it certainly does.
We know what he wants to say: Reason is that faculty whereby we 'perceive'
the light cast by the premisses of an argument on its conclusion-when the
argument is a good one and the premisses are primary light-sources. The
premisses are both sources of light and the casters of light; they are self-evident, but they are also evidence-for. When we 'perceive' that, then by metaphorical transference we can say that the faculty of Reason whereby we
'perceive' it is itself a light-source-though more like a candle than the sun.
One remembers Aristotle's example of "healthy" transferred from the healthy
person to the person's urine: "healthy urine"!
We come at last to what is perhaps most deeply felt in Locke's epistemological piety: Reason, the candle of the Lord, is inextinguishable. It cannot
be blown out. Locke observes that it is typical of the "parties of men" to
"cram their tenets down alI men's throats, whom they can get into their power,
without permitting them to examine their truth or falsehood .... " And so it is
that instead of greater light in the moral sciences, the "subject part of mankind, in most places, might...with Egyptian bondage, expect Egyptian darkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's minds, which
it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish"
(IV,iii,20).
The point is eminently Lockean, repeated over and over in the Essay. We
fail to expand our knowledge and fail to regulate our beliefs as we ought. We
fail to do our duties as cognitive and doxastic creatures. We violate the norms
for knowledge and belief. Thereby we disobey the Lord our God; for it is in
God's commanding some action of us, and in God's backing up that command
with sanctions, that obligation is to be located. We are one and alI epistemological sinners. Yet Reason remains.
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What sometimes diminishes our gUilt is that we have been "put upon" by
others -tyrannized. Then the fault lies more with the tyrant than with us.
Tyranny comes in many forms. One of the most pervasive and insidious is
epistemological tyranny: Trying to get people to believe things without examining them for themselves. Cramming tenets down the throats of men and
women without permitting them to examine their truth or falsehood. The
"authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable
truths," is no "small power [of] one man over another.... " So no wonder that
partisan leaders regularly "put their followers upon a necessity of receiving
some doctrines as such; which [is] to take them off from the use of their own
reason and judgment, and put them upon believing and taking them upon
trust, without farther examination: In which posture of blind credulity, they
might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who
had the skill and office to principle and guide them" (I,iv,24). All too often
the leader succeeds. All too often one finds followers who "are resolved to
stick to [the] party, that education or interest has engaged them in; and there,
like the common soldiers of an army, show their courage and warmth, as their
leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing the cause they
contend for" (IV,xx,18).
It is to this pervasiveness of epistemological tyranny that Locke mainly
points when, in The Reasonableness of Christianity, he addresses himself at
some length to the question why revelation was necessary. Locke affirms that
God may well reveal things to us which are beyond our human capacities for
finding out. But that is not what he emphasizes in The Reasonableness.
Instead he argues that most of the content of Christianity is reasonable-that
is to say, probable on satisfactory evidence available to us human beings. Yet
it remains the case that most of it was not in fact discovered; and what little
was discovered, was either confined to hermetic philosophical circles or
publicized in a thoroughly unpersuasive manner. The lack of persuasiveness
was due, in part, to rhetorical inadequacies in the presentation. And no doubt
there was more than enough laziness to spread around. But advance in the
knowledge of natural religion and natural law was above all stymied by the
epistemological tyranny of those who held religious power in their hands: the
'priests' .
Though the works of nature, in every part of them, sufficiently evidence a
Deity, yet the world made so little use of their reason that they saw him not
where, even by the impressions of himself, he was easy to be found. Sense
and lust blinded their minds in some, and a careless inadvertency in others,
and fearful apprehensions in most. .. gave them up into the hands of their
priests, to fill their heads with false notions of the Deity, and their worship
with foolish rites ... .In this state of darkness and ignorance of the true God,
vice and superstition held the world. Nor could any help be had or hoped for
from reason, which could not be heard, and was judged to have nothing to
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do in the case, the priests everywhere, to secure their empire, having excluded
reason from having anything to do in religion .... The belief and worship of
one God was the national religion of the Israelites alone; and if we will
consider it, it was introduced and supported amongst the people by revelation.
They were in Goshen and had light, while the rest of the world were in almost
Egyptian darkness (Reasonableness §238). 4

The Israelites "were in Goshen and had light." Once again. the light metaphor. But the light which the Israelites uniquely enjoyed was neither the
evidence of propositions nor the capacity of discerning that evidence. It was
the light of revelation. On a few occasions Locke speaks of Reason as a mode
of revelation; as, for example, when he says that "When we find out an idea,
by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two others, this is a
revelation from God to us, by the voice of Reason. For we then come to know
a truth we did not know before. When God declares any truth to us, this is a
revelation to us by the voice of his Spirit, and we are advanced in our
knowledge" (IV, vii, 11). But he immediately goes on to distinguish Reason as
revelation from revelation proper, in which "God himself affords [a truth]
immediately to us, and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring
veracity" (ibid.). It is this that Locke sometimes describes as light: "the light
of revelation." In revelation, God "illuminates the mind with supernatural
light" (lV,xix, 14); God "enlighten[s] the understanding by a ray darted into
the mind immediately from the fountain of light" (lV,xlx,5). "God, in giving
us the light of Reason has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording
us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation" (lV,xviii,8). The "clear revelation" which our Savior brought into the world, viz., the "light of the gospel,"
has "dissipated the darkness" and "dispelled" the "mists" (Reasonableness
§239).
Must we then qualify the claim that the only "true light in the mind" is the
evidence originating from propositions: Self-evidence, or the evidence which
the self-evident facts provide for others? Locke thinks not. He reasons as
follows: Revelation is at bottom testimony, Divine testimony; and testimony
in general, if it be veridical, is a form of evidence, thereby, of light. Indeed,
testimony is "all the light we have in many cases; and we receive from it a
great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence"
(IV,xvi,ll).
It is, though, a somewhat peculiar form of evidence, on Locke's construal
of how it works as evidence. If S testifies that P is true, then, if I have
evidence that the relevant type of speech-act to which S's testimony belongs
is an overall reliable type, S's testimony functions for me as evidence concerning the truth of P; otherwise, it doesn't. The fact that S testified to P does
not by itself cast evidence on anything whatsoever. Let's apply the point. If
someone says that God revealed P to her, then there are two relevant types
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of speech-acts to be concerned with: One is the type, God testifying to something, and the other is the relevant sub-type of that large and amorphous type,
human being testifying that God testified to something. Once we have located
the relevant sub-type of the latter, we then collect satisfactory evidence for
its reliability. If Reason tells us that on that evidence the type is probably
reliable, then Reason in turn tells us that it is probable, on that evidence, that
the human testifier spoke truly in testifying that God testified to something.
We are then ready to consider how reliable is the type, God testifying to
something. Our Reason tells, without more ado, that this type is totally reliable; it is self-evidently so. And so, of course, this example of the type is true
testimony. In short, though it is appropriate to speak of the light of revelation,
and more broadly, of the light of testimony, Locke does not regard that light,
at bottom, as different from the light of evidence.
History is filled with people thinking divine revelation had occurred when
it had not. Anyone who is not willing to "give himself up to all the extravagancies of delusion and error" concerning the occurrence of revelation "must
bring this guide of his light within to the trial"-that is, must allow Reason
to render judgment as to whether some purported episode of revelation was
really an episode. To act otherwise would be deeply irresponsible, a violation
of the commands of God.
God when he makes the prophet does not unmake the man. He leaves all his
faculties in their natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations,
whether they be of divine original or no. When he illuminates the mind with
supernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would
have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth
by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes it known to be a truth,
which he would have us assent to, by his authority, and convinces us that it
is from him, by some marks which Reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason
must be our last judge and guide in every thing. I do not mean, that we must
consult Reason, and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can
be made out by natural principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject
it: But consult it we must, and by it examine, whether it be a revelation from
God or no: And if Reason finds it to be revealed from God, Reason then
declares for it, as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates
(IV,xix,14).

Epistemological tyranny is one, though only one, of those various dynamics
in human life and affairs which lead us to fail, and to cause others to fail, in
carrying out our divinely-imposed cognitive and doxastic obligations.
Locke's explicit view is that such failure is, at bottom, a failure of will rather
than of Reason. Certainly it's true that the 'perceptive' powers of Reason
come in varying degrees. "There are some men," says Locke, "of one, some
but of two syllogisms ... " (lV,xx,5). Give them a syllogism in any form but
Barbara, or maybe Barbara plus Celarent, and they are helpless. But if
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Reason-the capacity to 'perceive' the logical force of arguments-is wholly
absent in a creature of human form, then that creature is not yet truly human
or no longer truly human. Either infant or mad. Thus our nature as human
beings constitutes a fundamental limitation on the power of the epistemological tyrant: Try as he may, he cannot extinguish the light of Reason in his
subjects, short of driving them into madness. Glory be to God for this inestimable gift of Reason!5
All well and good, we say, that all of us carry about within ourselves a
candle of Reason which even the most subtle epistemological tyrant can
extinguish only by plunging us into the darkness of madness. What good does
that do us if we find ourselves in "almost Egyptian darkness," wherein we
neither desire nor dare to use our candles to illuminate anything except what
the tyrant wishes or permits?
The answer is that, for it to do any good, epistemological tyranny must be
overthrown and a new 'liberal' society created. It is then that we will have
ground for celebrating, with thankful relief, the fact that the candle of the
Lord had never been extinguished. It is then that its light can be put to use.
Lockean epistemological piety requires as its counterpart the struggle for
social reform. The confidence that the candle of Reason, no matter how subtle
the devices of the epistemological tyrant, had not been extinguished in sane
adults, is what gives us hope to initiate the struggle.
A new kind of education will have to be instituted, aimed at inducting
citizens, from childhood up, into that practice which constitutes rightly conducting one's understanding. The educational reforms Locke recommended,
in the letters published as Some Thoughts concerning Education, were regarded by him as an indispensable part of his total vision; that becomes clear
from his late small book, The Conduct of the Understanding. And a new kind
of space for a new kind of public discourse will have to be created-a space
of "peace, and the common offices of humanity, and friendship, in the diversity of opinions." For
we cannot reasonably expect, that anyone should readily and obsequiously
quit his own opinion, and embrace ours with a blind resignation to an authority, which the understanding of man acknowledges not. For however it may
often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to
the will and dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your sentiments, be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave, at
his leisure, to go over the account again, and recalling what is out of his
mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which side the advantage
lies ... (IV,xvi,4 ).
Pretty clearly Locke placed his own writing in the context of this struggle
for a new kind of society. In the "Epistle to the Reader," with which he
prefaced the Essay, he first remarks (probably with false modesty) that he
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had so little desire to appear in print that if he had not been flattered that his
Essay "might be of some use to others," he would "have confined it to the
view of some friends, who gave the first occasion for it." He then continues,
"My appearing therefore in print, being on purpose to be as useful as I may,
I think it necessary to make, what I have to say, as easy and intelligible to
all sorts of readers as I can." Locke was not an academic writing for academics but an intellectual writing for the shapers of English society.
Gratitude for God's gifts of human nature and revelation, along with obedience to God's commands for the use of our cognitive and doxastic nature,
the obedience shading into a struggle for social reform nourished by the
hope-generating confidence that, no matter how deep the Egyptian darkness
in which our sane comrades may find themselves, the candle of the Lord
within them will not have been extinguished-those are the main contours
of what I have called Locke's "epistemological piety."
One more point must be made. It's a point that casts a dark shadow over
that bright hope-though I find no evidence that Locke himself acknowledged that. In the penultimate chapter of the Essay, titled "Of wrong Assent,
or Errour," Locke makes some general observations about the causes of
falsehood in our beliefs. "Want of proofs," he says, is one such cause, along
with "want of ability to use them" and "want of will to use them" (IV,xx, 1).
But far and away the most interesting and portentous cause is the fourth:
"wrong measures of probability." People make mistakes in their appraisal of
the logical force of arguments. On first hearing, this sounds like the manifestation of a defect in Reason: Reason too is fallen. But that can't be what
Locke means. Reason is a mode of apprehension, of awareness, of 'perception'. And either one 'perceives' something or one doesn't; there's no such
thing as erroneously 'perceiving' it. To be a man of but one syllogism is to
be 'perceptive' of only one pattern of entailment, not to perceive entailments
where there aren't any.
An obvious reply is that though, indeed, one can't 'perceive' an argument
to be valid when it isn't, one might well have that peculiar 'I see it' experience, which typically comes with noting an entailment, in the face of an
argument which happens not to be an entailment. One's subjective rational
experience may get out of phase, in that way, with one's rational 'perception.'
But though this would have been an appropriate point to make, it's not the
point Locke does in fact make, apart from just a hint or two. His point is
more interesting-and with consequences which are, if anything, even more
unsettling for his trust and hope in the inextinguishable powers of Reason.
Locke locates the wrongness, of our wrong measures of probability, in our
beliefs concerning probability; beliefs can be false as well as true. His question, then, is what causes mistakes in such beliefs? He cites four causes. One
is "allegiance to authority." Though such allegiance occupies an extraordi-
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narily prominent place in the totality of Locke's discussion, his citation of it
here raises nothing new. Quite the opposite for the others, which he calls
"inculcated principles," "received hypotheses," and "prevailing passions."
Here is Locke's thought: When some falsehood has been inculcated in one
from childhood as a self-evidently true principle, then, when one later 'perceives' its contradictory, one may well emerge still believing that falsehood
rather than now believing its contradictory. When one has staked one's academic reputation on the cogency of some argument, then, when one's students
later point out some fallacy therein, one may well emerge still believing that
the original argument is valid. And when some proposition that one believes
to be false is also one that one passionately wants to be false, then, even
though one discerns its high probability on satisfactory evidence, one may
continue to believe it is false, telling oneself that one can't be at all sure about
the strength of the argument nor whether the evidence is satisfactory.
It's true that we are not, in such cases, confronted with an error of Reason,
as Locke understands Reason. But neither are we confronted with a fallen
will. What we have instead is a "wound of the mind," of a most interesting
sort. "Wound of the mind" is my phrase, not Locke's. But not only does it
capture Locke's thought; Locke himself was fond of using medical metaphors. The fact that someone, who 'perceives' the proposition P on a certain
occasion, does so as one who has long believed firmly that not-P is self-evidently true, inhibits that 'perception' from evoking in him, as it otherwise
would, the belief that P. The fact that someone, who 'perceives' the non-cogency of argument A on a certain occasion, does so as one who has long
believed firmly that A is cogent, inhibits that 'perception' from evoking in
him, as it otherwise would, the belief that P. And so, similarly, for passion
inhibiting the recognition that one's evidence is as good as it is likely ever
to be and that one does 'perceive' its force. Our prior passions and our prior
beliefs wound the mind in such a way that Reason's 'perceptions' fail to evoke
the beliefs that they otherwise would evoke, if the mind were functioning
properly.
"There is scarce anyone," says Locke, "so floating and superficial in his
understanding, who hath not some reverenced propositions, which are to him
the principles on which he bottoms his reasonings; and by which he judgeth
of truth and falsehood, right and wrong ... " (I,iii,24). But those may be false.
The cure Locke recommends is examining carefully what one believes: using
one's Reason. Some want "skill and leisure" for that, "others the inclination;
and some have been "taught, that they ought not, to examine ... (ibid.). So we,
the reformers, have to try to evoke the desire for such examination in our
fellows, and struggle to provide the opportunity. All this is standard Lockean
fare-shortly to become standard 'liberal' fare. But what do we do if the mind
that someone brings to the examination has been wounded by prior beliefs
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and passions, so that, though Reason continues to do its work, the person
doesn't recognize that it is doing it? The candles of humanity may be inextinguishable; but is that much ground for hope if, as we human beings try to
find our way in this almost Egyptian darkness, we often don't recognize
Reason's illumination when we see it and sometimes think we are recognizing
it when we are not? And lastly: What about us, the liberal reformers: Have
we managed to avoid the wounding of our own minds? Don't we also have
"reverenced propositions"?
In the main, Locke's epistemological piety seems to me eminently appropriate for his epistemological convictions-eminently appropriate for one
who is a Christian, that is. Not here. The hope goes well beyond what the
convictions can sustain.
In its overall contours it was a version of Protestant piety that Locke
delineated-not surprisingly, of course, giving his Puritan rearing. In
Augustinian piety one turns inward, away from the world, and then upward,
in the hope of a vision of God; the utility of the material world for our
endurance is exhaustive of its significance for us. Not so, in Byzantine piety.
The material world is not only useful for our endurance but mediates God to
us; in the combination of those, but especially in the latter, lies its significance
for us. Protestantism went beyond even this, to say that the bread and the
wine of the Eucharist have a taste to be savored; the icons, color and design
to be enjoyed. The worth of the world is not exhausted by its utility for our
endurance nor even by its mediation of the divine; it is also for our flourishing. Lockean piety is an example of this 'turn toward the world' represented
by Protestant piety. It has taken this 'turn' far beyond classical Protestantism,
however. The longing for union with God which is so prominent in Calvin,
for example, is almost totally absent from Locke. Lockean piety is a truncated
version of Protestant piety. 6
The converse of Locke's epistemological piety fitting his epistemology is
that the piety is unfitting to other epistemologies. Reject the epistemology,
and the piety is rendered irrelevant and inappropriate. The epistemology was
already subjected to powerful attack by Hume-though few people at the
time, apart from Reid and his followers, recognized or conceded that. The
essence of Hume's attack, as I understand it, was his argument that there are
vast ranges of fact to which Locke's method, rigorously followed, gives us
no access at all, let alone, best access. Inductive inference, for example, gives
us reliable access to a host of facts to which Locke's method, strictly followed, would give no access. Reid took the same line of thought much farther.
Perception, memory, and testimony all give us reliable access to facts to
which the rigorous use of Locke's method gives no access. For example, so
argued Reid, the project of not accepting testimony until one has located some
relevant type to which it belongs and then established, in Lockean fashion,
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the overall reliability of that type, is hopeless. I find the Hume-Reid attack
devastatingly compelling.
Which poses the ultimate possibility: May it also be the case that there are
facts about God to which Locke's method does not give us best access? If
perception, memory, and testimony are modes of belief-formation which give
better access to various ranges of facts than what Locke sets forth as doing
one's best, what reason is there for supposing that his method nonetheless
provides best access to truths about God? No reason at all, so I and my fellow
'Reformed epistemologists' have argued. Which puts us in the position of
also rejecting Lockean epistemological piety.

Yale University
NOTES
1. A recent book which argues this point for Locke's political thought is Joshua
Mitchell's Not by Reason Alone: Religion, History, and Identity in Early Modern Political
Thought (Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1993).
2. The interpretation of Locke's epistemology which I will offer will have to be sketched
in broad strokes here, and by and large unsubstantiated by textual references. For a full
and substantiated treatment, see my John Locke and the Ethics of Belief. forthcoming.
3. Though I won't remark on it further, the eschatological note sounded in this passage
is also a component in Locke's epistemological piety. The passage continues as follows:
" ... wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might by every day's
experience be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to error; the sense
whereof might be a constant admonition to us, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage
with industry and care, in the search, and following of that way, which might lead us to
a state of greater perfection."
4. Locke is explaining, in this passage, why it was that those aspects of God which can
be known without any appeal to revelation were in fact not discovered by human beings
using only their natural cognitive powers--or if discovered, not effectively publicized. In
§241 ff. he addresses the counterpart question of why it was that those of our duties which
can be known without any appeal to revelation-that is, 'natural law' -were in fact not
discovered by human beings using only their natural cognitive powers. His answer to this
question goes along essentially the same lines as his answer to the former.
5. Given the popularity of Locke and of Locke's perspective in early eighteenth century
England, I would confidently guess that somewhere in the hymnody of the period is to be
found praise to God for Reason; I happen not to know of any such hymn, however.
6. There's yet another way in which Lockean piety is an eccentric version of Protestant
piety: In classic Protestantism, the governing metaphors are auditory: speaking and
listening. Though Locke does, on a few occasions, speak about listening to the voice of
Reason, his govenring metaphors are overwhemingly visual.

